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Introduction 
 
Traditional measures of space power have focused on the activities of a 
nation’s military and civil space programs. This common emphasis comes 
from the Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union created 
well-funded, government-run, and largely military-led (and sometimes 
secret) space programs to “show the flag,” support their operational forces 
and intelligence needs, and prevent surprise nuclear attacks. Since the 
early 2000s, China has entered this club with a large-scale space pro- 
gram run by its military while also conducting civil human spaceflight and 
a range of scientific and quasi-commercial activities. After a decade of 
severe decline in the 1990s, Russia’s space program has rebounded under 
President Vladimir Putin and, according to some accounts, is set to 
surpass Soviet achievements, especially regarding new military 
capabilities, including counterspace.1 
 
According to some popular and expert reports, the United States is falling 
behind in comparison to these rising and revanchist space powers.2 As 
Vice President Michael Pence stated at the first meeting of the newly 
revived National Space Council in the fall of 2017: “America seems to have 
lost our edge in space.”3 
 
US military leaders are legitimately concerned. US intelligence officials 
recently released an assessment stating that Russia will likely deploy new 
antisatellite weapons within the next few years for use against US space 
assets.4 US Strategic Command’s Gen John Hyten also stated recently, 
“From a defense perspective, the isolation [as a result of Western 
sanctions] has not slowed the Russian modernization program . . . on the 
space side.”5 Russia also remains the only country currently delivering US 
astronauts to the International Space Station and continues to pro- duce 
the main engine used in the United States’ Atlas V rocket, setting up 
uncomfortable dependencies for the United States. 
 
Regarding China, Air Force Lt Gen Steven Kwast has argued that Beijing 
has a relative advantage in its preparedness for space conflict, stating, “In 
my best military judgment, China is on a 10-year journey to operationalize 
space. We’re on a 50-year journey.”6 In civil space,  a major US news 
magazine recently concluded that, in contrast to currently vague US goals, 
“China is boldly moving ahead with its own space exploration efforts, and 
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with little ambiguity about its mission,” given its continuing manned 
spaceflights, new Hainan Island launch site, and plans for larger boosters.7 
 
Finally, military analyst Brian Chow says that the United States is facing “a 
new game-changing threat under development in China and Russia” in the 
form of spacecraft with robotic arms that might quickly disable US 
military satellites in a conflict.8 Such negative assessments of US space 
power are based on traditional determinants, which presume that 
capabilities emerge almost exclusively from top-down, government 
funded, and largely military-led efforts, where centralization, national 
autonomy, and secrecy play key roles. Aspects of these trends are indeed 
worrisome. However, do they tell the whole story? Or are there other 
factors that need to be considered in evaluating comparative twenty- first-
century space power? 
 
Traditional, state-run approaches to space security have led authors to 
three assumptions: (1) that war in space is inevitable, (2) that nations will 
have to rely exclusively on their assets for fighting in space, and (3) that 
space wars will be dominated by offensive strategies, as opposed to space- 
based defensive or deterrent approaches. One of the leading realist 
scholars on space power, Everett Dolman, makes this case, “if some state 
or organization should desire to contest or control space, denying the 
fruits thereof to another state, there is simply no defense against such 
action—there is only deterrence through the threat of asymmetric, Earth-
centered retaliation.”9 
 
However, new conditions may facilitate other options, such as space- 
based deterrence by denial. A state may, over time, create a resilient con- 
stellation of hundreds of networked satellites (national, commercial, and 
allied) that may be able to convince an adversary that its forces will not be 
able to accomplish their objective of denying space-derived information. 
In 2016, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Loverro stated in 
congressional testimony, “we must remove the likelihood that attacks in 
space will succeed. Strangely enough, there are those who believe that we 
cannot do this… That conclusion would be untrue.”10 
 
In the modern world, technological, economic, social, scientific, and even 
military dimensions of power have begun to shift from the national to the 
international context. This point suggests that space power will also be 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss1/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.1.1729
17 
 
affected by globalization and interdependence, where networks and 
success in innovation are becoming at least as important as national 
government capabilities in creating power and influence. Indeed, the 
highly nationalistic and state-focused strategies of Russia and China may 
in the future represent anachronisms rather than cutting-edge approaches 
to space security. At the same time, new forms of networked space power 
could offer the United States a distinct advantage. If this is true, then 
assessments of comparative future power in space must be reexamined 
and, possibly, recalculated based on new measures. As Loverro argues 
regarding the proper response to the threats posed by Russia and China in 
space, “the US response is clear—we must leverage our two natural and 
sustained space advantages: the US commercial/entrepreneurial space 
sector, and our ability to form coalitions with our space-faring allies.”11 
 
If such comparative advantages can be exploited to supplement national 
assets and eventually transform narrow, national defensive capabilities 
into more robust architectures, then the autonomous, highly centralized, 
military-led, nationalistic, and secretive space programs that dominated 
the Cold War period could face new challenges of their own against more 
resilient, networked space coalitions. A key variable affecting these trends 
is the future nature of space innovation. Will traditional state-run 
programs lead it or instead will it be led by commercial actors, who may 
move more quickly in responding to market conditions and in developing 
new technologies? These dynamics merit particular attention, as effective 
innovation will be the main driver of future space transformation and, 
consequently, changes in space power. 
 
This article first presents a brief history of the Cold War and the 
“technocratic” approach to space power. It then assesses how the United 
States—after riding high in the 1990s—suffered relative declines in the 
military and civil space sectors after 2000 compared to Russia and China. 
Next, it reconsiders emerging trends in space activity and the increasing 
(and often discounted) role of the commercial space sector, especially 
start-up innovators. It also considers the potential contributions of 
military space allies, proposing a new concept for space power via 
networked capabilities. Finally, the article assesses future US, Chinese, 
and Russian prospects in space. It concludes that the United States—
thanks to its vibrant commercial space sector and its emerging 
partnerships with space- proficient allies—has greater potential than its 
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rivals to retain (and even expand) its future space power and influence. 
However, this will require continued US national commitment to space 
and favorable policies in regard to the commercial sector and US allies. 
 
A Brief History of Cold War Space Power 
 
Looking back at Cold War trends in space power assessments, the popular 
metrics for success were the number and size of launches, 
accomplishments by astronauts (first in orbit, first spacewalk, and first on 
the moon), the fielding of military support technologies, and discoveries in 
space science. These areas depended almost completely on state-run and 
state-funded programs throughout the Cold War. It was a period 
dominated by the two superpowers who together conducted well over 95 
percent of space launches up through 1991.12 As historian Walter 
McDougall argued in his 1985 Pulitzer prize-winning book, space activity 
embodied the post–World War II concept of “technocracy,” which he 
defined as “the institutionalization of technological change for state 
purposes, that is, the state-funded and -managed R&D explosion of our 
time.”13 Without state sponsorship and military interest, McDougall 
observed, the US-Soviet “space race” and its many technological 
developments would not have taken place. 
 
In building space power, the Soviet Union benefited from its larger rockets 
and ability to put significant payloads—instruments, canines, and 
humans—into space. With the Soviet Union’s accomplishments piling up, 
from Sputnik I’s launch in 1957 through Yuri Gagarin’s spaceflight in 1961 
and then other flashy Soviet “firsts” (two people in space, then three, and 
then a spacewalk), the United States was seen as woefully lagging behind 
Moscow in perceived space power. However, public perception was only 
part of the story. In the secretive world of national security space, the 
Soviet Union knew the United States was creating advantages. The first 
reconnaissance satellites (Grab and Corona) achieved success in 1961, 
years before their Soviet counterparts, but the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations chose to keep their existence secret. During the 1960s, US 
technological advantages in reliable electronics, computers, and 
miniaturization combined to move the United States even further ahead in 
national security space. Furthermore, it helped to facilitate the highly 
successful and well-publicized Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo pro- grams, 
which culminated in the 1969 moon landing. This event finally ended the 
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notion of the Soviets leading the way in space power, at least until the late 
1970s.14 
 
Meanwhile, China lagged even further behind, conducting its first space 
launch in 1970. The influence of Communist Party politics plagued China’s 
space program—and overall “technocratic” power— during the 1960s and 
1970s. This came as a result of the anti-Western Cultural Revolution 
(which sent thousands of engineers into the countryside for reeducation) 
and an unlucky association with General Lin Biao, whose alleged coup 
attempt against Mao Zedong in 1971 and subsequent death in a suspicious 
airplane crash in Mongolia set back the space program for nearly a 
decade.15 Only in the 1980s did China begin to emerge as a fledgling space 
power under Deng Xiaoping, by building a space launch infrastructure and 
a cadre of space-trained personnel.16 
  
The failure of the United States to launch any astronauts during the Carter 
administration in the late 1970s began to raise concerns of a US space 
power decline. Critics of the US program began pointing to Soviet long-
duration flights on a series of Salyut stations and to counterspace 
capabilities from the resumption of Soviet antisatellite testing. Popular 
fears of a relative US nuclear and space power “gap” helped elect Ronald 
Reagan.17 The Challenger disaster in 1986 and coincidental problems with 
the US Air Force’s satellite launch program led to renewed assessments—
including the cover story of Time magazine in October 1987—of a 
dangerous advance in Soviet space capabilities.18 However, the United 
States again resumed its stature as the leader in space with  a series of 
successful shuttle flights and new constellations of military satellites, 
including the groundbreaking capabilities introduced by the Global 
Positioning System (GPS). The Soviet Union’s collapse led to the selling off 
of many Russian space technologies, which later contributed to China’s 
emergence in space. 
 
Space Power Dynamics in the 1990s: US Hegemony 
 
The early post–Cold War period was characterized by US technocratic 
dominance in space. US space accomplishments included the successful 
operation of the space shuttle, leadership in organizing the construction of 
the International Space Station (ISS), commercialization of the military 
GPS system (a vast windfall for US companies), and the reestablishment of 
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military space launch reliability under the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle program. 
 
Meanwhile, Russia experienced its sharpest decline in space power— in 
both relative and absolute terms—since 1957. Although a legacy fleet of 
launchers allowed it to maintain a significant role in the newly 
internationalized, post–Cold War commercial launch sector, its 
constellations deteriorated significantly, its spending on civil space 
dropped precipitously, and its military space program developed wide 
gaps in capability, suffering dangerous “blackout” periods in space-based 
recon- naissance and early warning. With post-Soviet Russia on the brink 
of economic collapse, NASA opted to extend a helping hand to the Russian 
Space Agency in the form of contracts for astronaut flights to the Russian 
Mir station and cooperative work on the ISS. US goals in this cooperative 
effort included lowering overall costs for the station and preventing former 
Soviet missile scientists from taking jobs in countries of proliferation 
concern.19 
 
Nevertheless, Russian space employment dropped precipitously due to 
long periods of unpaid wages, as the Yeltsin government struggled 
financially. By 1996, the Russian Space Agency’s budget had declined to a 
mere $700 million.20 As Brian Harvey describes, despite efforts by the 
Energiya enterprise to keep up with its commitments to the ISS in the late 
1990s in the face of on-again, off-again support from the Yeltsin 
administration, “new  [state] funding turned out to be a complex set  of 
bank loans rather than on-the-spot cash. Dates again slipped and slipped. 
The situation worsened with inflation and the slide of the ruble on foreign 
exchanges.”21 US funding helped salvage some of the work, and the 
Russians met their commitments, albeit late. The de-orbiting of Russia’s 
Mir space station in early 2000, due to lack of funding, marked the 
symbolic end to this humiliating period of relative decline for Russia. The 
subsequent launch of the Zvezda module for the ISS marked a new start, 
as did Russia’s success in marketing the Proton booster, which had 17 
commercial launches by the end of the decade.22 
 
China in the 1990s was still emerging slowly as a “technocratic” space 
power. It began pursuing a state-led, import substitution strategy by ac- 
quiring foreign technology and learning to build copies. With Russian 
enterprises struggling to survive, China benefited greatly from fire-sale 
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prices for major space technologies, especially for its own future human 
spaceflight operations. The Chinese government also invested heavily in 
the development of space manufacturing infrastructure and personnel, 
making only small advances in near-term capability but setting the 
foundation for later growth. In the commercial sector, it benefited in part 
from the Reagan administration’s cooperative agreements, which 
eventually allowed 26 US commercial satellites to be launched on Chinese 
Long March boosters by the end of the next decade. However, this 
program— under the state-created Great Wall Industry Corporation—
came to a halt in 1999 after the House report, U.S. National Security and 
Military/ Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (“Cox 
Report”), alleged the transfer of sensitive information by two US space 
companies during investigations after failed Chinese launches.23 The 
cessation of this cooperation cut Chinese commercial space revenues 
dramatically in the initial years of US sanctions and heightened export 
controls.24 
 
In the military sector, this period saw significant Chinese investments in 
research and development, but few tests. Little hint of the military 
direction of China’s space program in the coming decade would be found 
at the time. However, China had witnessed the United States’ use of space-
supported warfare in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and the Balkans in the late 
1990s. This convinced Beijing of its dangerous inferiority and the need to 
be prepared to challenge and defeat US space assets   in a crisis. The 
Chinese military’s new goal of being able to fight “local wars under 
modern, high-tech conditions” meant that disruption of US space-
supported command, control, communications, and intelligence would 
take on a new level of importance in the future.25 
 
Shifts in Space Power from 2000 to 2017: Russia’s Resurgence, 
China’s Rise 
 
The twenty-first century began with an all-consuming terrorist strike 
against the US homeland in the form of the 9/11 attacks. In this 
environment, space became a secondary priority for Washington, and the 
two main elements of US space power—civil and military space— both 
struggled, allowing China and Russia to make relative gains. The United 
States remained the world leader in civil and military space, but its 
reigning position diminished. The commercial sector continued to grow 
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steadily but did not yield revolutionary, sector-changing products in 
launch, communications, human spaceflight, space manufacturing, or 
imagery. Relative US space power suffered under both the Bush and 
Obama administrations, which witnessed tight budgets and the untimely 
cancellation of the US space shuttle program without a replacement. 
 
NASA faced considerable problems in the early 2000s, beginning with the 
2003 Columbia disaster, which killed all the astronauts aboard during a 
breakup as the shuttle reentered the atmosphere. The stand- down of 
shuttle operations forced the United States to rely on Russia for access to 
the ISS. This was the first such period of dependency, but not the last. 
Pres. George W. Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration speech in 2004 
attempted to rally NASA for a cooperative return to the moon as a 
jumping-off point to Mars.26 However, in the midst of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the US administration could not offer any real 
funding. President Obama’s attempt to continue elements of that pro- 
gram with the Asteroid Redirect Mission failed to garner either 
congressional or public support. With the end of shuttle flights in 2011, 
NASA entered into its second and longest period of dependence on Russia 
for human spaceflight. While the completion and operation of the ISS 
marked major accomplishments and the Mars Rover program captured 
the public’s attention, an inherited budget deficit forced the Obama ad- 
ministration to cut NASA’s budget and its planned return to the moon. US 
civil space leadership suffered globally as a result.27 
 
In the face of rising threats to US space assets, however, the Obama 
administration developed new concepts in its 2010 US National Space 
Policy and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. These documents set 
a course away from traditional US nationalism in space toward inter- 
national engagement, including operational cooperation with allies. By 
2016, the United States had signed over a dozen space situational aware- 
ness sharing agreements with foreign countries and 50 companies and 
commercial organizations.28 Also, in 2015, the US military began work 
toward a Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) 
to begin the process of operationalizing space cooperation with allies and 
the commercial sector. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter established the 
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Mountain View, 
California. The goal was to increase the pace of adopting innovations from 
Silicon Valley’s commercial start-up companies into the realm of military 
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deployment to boost effectiveness and save money. However, this effort 
had limited initial results and had to be reorganized. The JICSpOC also 
failed to achieve its intended mission. In the face of emerging Russian and 
Chinese threats, the outgoing Obama administration approved funding for 
$5 billion aimed at increasing “space protection” capabilities. Overall, 
however, under both Bush and Obama, the United States failed to address 
a series of problems in civil and military space enterprises in a context 
where promising commercial technologies had not yet yielded significant 
security benefits. 
 
Meanwhile, Russia under Vladimir Putin took a very different activist 
course to reconstitute its space program in the early 2000s. Recognizing 
the military vulnerability Russia faced and the fact that the nation’s space 
program represented one of the few remaining elements of Russia’s 
international prestige, he pursued several actions. Putin plugged the gaps 
in his military constellations, restored the Russian GLONASS GPS system, 
and upgraded the military launch site at Plesetsk. Most worrisome, Putin 
restarted work on several counterspace programs, dormant since the Cold 
War, citing new threats from US missile defenses and the X-37B 
experimental space plane. Russia began testing its Nudol direct-ascent 
antisatellite system and undertook a series of on-orbit experiments in 
proximity operations, including near some Western communications 
satellites in geostationary orbit.29 
 
Drawing on revenues from newly renationalized oil and gas companies, 
Putin also restored the civil space budget. Due to Russia’s average annual 
economic growth of 7 percent from 2003 to 2007, the Russian space 
program underwent a remarkable “resurgence,” in the words of French 
space expert Bertrand de Montluc.30 He specifically cited Russia’s 
leadership in commercial space launch. But Montluc cautioned that 
Russia’s long-term strategy remained unclear, noting, “Reusable launchers 
will not be on the cards for another 30 years.”31 Nevertheless, Russia’s 
possession of the Soyuz launcher eventually made it the sole point of 
access to the ISS, putting it into a de facto leadership role. Not 
surprisingly, President Putin used his leverage to increase the price for 
foreign astronauts of a round-trip ride to the ISS to $70 million. Under 
President Dmitri Medvedev (2008–12), Russia also began an effort to 
stimulate a start-up sector by creating the Skolkovo Innovation Center 
near Moscow. With state funding and a favorable “incubator” 
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environment, several small firms emerged, mostly in the launch 
components sector.32 However, their activities remained minor, due in 
part to opposition from the state sector, indicating a Russian preference 
for traditional technocracy. 
 
Efforts to reconstitute Russia’s former space science glory proved un- 
successful. The much-ballyhooed flight of the Phobos-Grunt spacecraft to 
a moon of Mars in November 2011 (with a range of Russian and foreign, 
including Chinese, scientific payloads) ended in a disastrous failure. When 
faulty computer chips caused the spacecraft to become unresponsive 
shortly after launch, it became stranded in a low, uncontrolled orbit 
around Earth. The reentry and breakup of this expensive and much-
anticipated mission in early 2012 met with finger-pointing about failures 
of quality control within Roscosmos and political pressures to launch. 
However, flush with cash, the Russian government doubled down on a 
major plan for lunar and planetary exploration. The development of a 
series of new launchers, plus the construction of a major new launch site 
in the Russian Far East (Vostochny) was intended to remove Russia’s 
dependence on—and $115 million in yearly rent payments for—the former 
Soviet launch facility at Baikonur in Kazakhstan. 
 
Russia’s space resurgence reached a high-water mark in 2014 when 
Roscosmos’s annual budget totaled a healthy $4.2 billion, and Russia 
conducted 35 successful launches, far surpassing both the United States 
and China.33 However, the combined effects of corruption, Western 
sanctions after Russia’s seizure of Crimea and intervention in eastern 
Ukraine, and falling state oil and gas revenues eventually began to put 
pressure on Roscosmos. President Putin’s prized project—the Vostochny 
Far Eastern launch site—failed to meet its operational goal of a 2015 
launch due to rampant corruption, which resulted in politically 
embarrassing hunger strikes by unpaid workers, the loss of hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and the firing of two successive managers.34 Putin 
eventually took the unusual step of putting the project directly under the 
control of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin. In late 2015, to 
eradicate corruption and raise quality control after a series of Roscosmos 
launch failures, President Putin abolished the space agency altogether and 
established the eponymous “State Space Corporation Roscosmos” in early 
2016. It was described as a commercial unit of the Russian government 
intended to reduce corruption and run the consolidated space industry 
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according to best business practices. However, Roscosmos remained much 
more like a state enterprise than a commercial one. Vostochny finally 
conducted its first launch in April 2016. However, after a failed launch in 
November 2017, even Russian analysts began to downplay previously rosy 
prospects for the facility, discounting the possibility of any near-term 
cosmonaut launches. 
 
Meanwhile, China’s major state-led investments in space advancement 
began to bear fruit in the early 2000s. Fearful of US military space 
advantages, eager to rally public support for the communist leadership 
through high prestige space missions, and hopeful of spurring 
developments in high technology to benefit the Chinese economy, Beijing 
began to make deliberate efforts to advance its place in the space 
community. After several unmanned tests, the Chinese military launched 
Shenzhou V with its first taikonaut (Chinese astronaut) aboard in October 
2003, shocking the world by becoming the third country to launch and 
return a human from Earth orbit. A slow but steady series of successes in 
human spaceflight, including a small station (Tiangong 1) visited by 
taikonauts in 2012 put other countries on alert that China was making a 
long-term commitment to civil space activity, even if it was managed by 
the military. With an unmanned mission to the lunar surface with its Jade 
Rabbit rover, the establishment of a substantial space science program, 
and co-sponsorship (with Russia) of a UN initiative to prevent the 
weaponization of space, China sought to burnish its credentials as a 
responsible space player. In 2008, China attempted to establish itself as an 
international space leader by founding the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization (APSCO). The Beijing-based APSCO was modeled on the 
European Space Agency, but the limited space capability of its other 
members—including Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Peru—reduced the 
likelihood of any real technological synergies emerging from this 
cooperation.  
 
China’s kinetic antisatellite test in January 2007 showed another, more 
troubling side of its military-led space program. By flaunting international 
norms on debris mitigation and then continuing to develop a range of 
counterspace capabilities over the next decade, China showed a 
commitment to developing an offensive military space capability aimed at 
possible use against the United States in a future regional conflict. From 
being a virtually nonexistent military actor in 2000, China emerged by 
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2017 as a potent military competitor, albeit one with considerably less 
operational experience. 
 
Only in the commercial sector did China’s space capabilities seem to lag 
behind world space leaders. While China’s Great Wall Industry 
Corporation expanded its sales of on-orbit satellites and low-cost 
launches— to countries such as Nigeria, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Laos—the 
highly subsidized nature of most of these deals suggested that the criteria 
for sales were based more on politics than economics. In the launch sector, 
after its loss of launch rights for satellites with any US components after 
1999, China slowly gained a niche commercial market thanks to European 
efforts in developing satellites without US components. However, this 
market remained modest. 
 
More significantly, China successfully bypassed its former European 
partners in the Galileo GPS network by developing and launching its own 
system called BeiDou.35 With 23 satellites by 2016, the constellation 
entered into regional operation, with additional satellites and global 
functionality promised by 2020. China began to force domestic enterprises 
to purchase BeiDou receivers while enticing foreign countries to buy into 
the network on favorable terms. Overall, Chinese developments during the 
2000 to 2017 period marked major accomplishments relative to both 
Russia and the United States, although the US space program continued to 
lead the world in terms of its absolute space capabilities. 
 
Emerging Changes in Space Power Dynamics 
 
Until recently, the source of space power has relied heavily on state 
funding and innovation. However, over the past several years, the in- 
creasing share of commercial space in the total arena of space activity 
merits reevaluating traditional measures. Christopher Kirchhoff, a former 
official at DIUx, observes that “most innovation today—unlike that of two 
generations ago—takes place in the commercial sector, not government 
labs.”36 Accordingly, where state spending dominated space revenues well 
into the 2000s, today the commercial sector accounts for over three-
quarters of the $323 billion spent yearly across the globe on space 
activity.37 These new trends in space spending, activity, and the nexus of 
innovation suggest the need to consider a revised model of space power as 
we look toward the future. While the earlier space race period could be 
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accurately characterized as dominated by rival, state-led “technocracies,” a 
more flexible, disaggregated, and resilient “netocracy” is now emerging as 
a rival model of space organization (see Fig. 1.) It may soon prove to be a 
superior model for the challenges facing countries in establishing twenty-
first-century space power. We can define space-related netocracy as a new 
form of organization based on public- private partnerships, distributed 
architectures, rapid innovation, and the use of multiple commercial and 
allied partnerships. 
 
Fig. 1. Comparison of Space Power Models 
 
 
Conditions for the creation of net-centric space power are emerging from 
the so-called “New Space” revolution, where venture capital, dynamic 
entrepreneurs, scientific innovators, and a supportive political and legal 
infrastructure are combining to bring a whole range of new space 
technologies to the marketplace. Critical in this process is an environment 
that supports the free flow of ideas and people and protects intellectual 
property. Otherwise, innovators may develop to a certain stage and then 
move elsewhere for a more favorable business climate. Notably, such 
innovation “hubs” are present in some areas of the United States, due to a 
combination of technological factors, human capital, and political/legal 
mechanisms that have made rapid start-up formation possible and have 
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assured investors that successful companies will be al- lowed to keep 
profits and expand their businesses. Such conditions do not exist in Russia 
today and are only partly present in China, creating significant potential 
advantages for the United States. 
 
Another set of changing factors relates to the role of international 
cooperation in military space. In the past, the disparities in capabilities 
between the superpowers and other spacefaring countries were so stark 
that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have derived 
any substantive benefits from sharing constellations and engaging in 
extensive data-sharing or operational cooperation with allies.38 Until 2010, 
US National Space Policy had not made any mention of possible benefits 
to the United States from integrating aspects of the US military space 
program with those of its allies. However, those conditions have changed 
as a number of US friends and allies have now developed sophisticated 
space capabilities—including India, Israel, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom. Moreover, a number of these countries in 
Europe and Asia have the financial capability to contribute to advanced 
military space architectures, some of which are too expensive for even the 
United States to field alone. These space capabilities have raised the 
attractiveness of military space alliances for those countries that are 
willing to engage foreign space powers.  
 
In light of these new dynamics, how are the three leading space powers 
likely to fare going forward? Are the gloomy assessments of certain US 
experts and officials merited? 
 
US Trends 
 
The United States has begun to address its relative decline in space, 
although only in part due to government efforts. NASA’s budget remains 
flat, and the Department of Defense projects aimed at addressing the 
resilience of space assets are largely continuations of policies begun late in 
the Obama administration. However, these projects are now coming to 
fruition. General Hyten’s focus on space as a war-fighting realm has 
brought a new tone of seriousness to the US approach to military space 
protection, as has the standing up of the National Space Defense Center at 
Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The reestablishment of the National 
Space Council has raised the importance of space activity within the 
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national defense enterprise, while also highlighting the importance of 
public-private partnerships. Former Defense Secretary James Mattis’s 
decision to reform and reinvigorate the DIUx organization set up by his 
predecessor (and change the name to the Defense Innovation Unit-DIU), 
by increasing funding and expanding its reach, marked another positive 
sign. DIU can now fund projects directly and operates in Mountain View, 
Boston, Austin, and Washington, DC.39 
 
However, the most dynamic recent change in US space capabilities is 
coming from the commercial sector itself, especially among start-ups. 
Already, the space marketplace is being flooded with new products and 
services from these emerging US space ventures. These include 
revolutionary, low-cost services now being offered by US companies in the 
fields of Earth observation, space situational awareness, satellite tracking, 
space launch, and space manufacturing. After many years of promising 
change, New Space companies are now bringing revolutionary products to 
the marketplace, which is shifting space power leadership back toward the 
United States.40 
 
In Earth observation, the San Francisco-based company Planet now 
operates 150 satellites, the largest constellation of satellites ever launched 
by a private company or a government, providing daily revisits of all areas 
of the globe.41 In the field of space situational awareness, Menlo Park, 
California–based start-up LeoLabs is operating its own phased- array 
radar (constructed in Texas) and developing the largest catalog of low 
Earth orbital objects outside the US government.42 It plans to expand this 
network with three additional radars, supported by a growing commercial 
and governmental client base. In space manufacturing, another Mountain 
View-based start-up, Made in Space, now operates the only 3-D printer on 
the ISS and is working toward the capability to build and robotically 
assemble large structures in orbit, thus drastically reducing construction 
costs.43 Each of these companies is helping the United States build new 
elements for future space power and resilience.  
 
In the launch field, 2017 marked the first time the United States has led 
global launches since 2003, with 29 successful orbital missions, compared 
to 20 for Russia and 16 for China.44 Even more remarkable is the fact that 
Elon Musk’s Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) company 
conducted 18 successful launches. SpaceX has the prospect to launch more 
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in the future if the company can perfect its ability to return boosters to the 
ground and reuse them safely. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket also surpassed 
Russia’s Soyuz as the most successful launcher for the first time. Other US 
companies, including the United Launch Alliance and Orbital ATK, add to 
the US tally, while start-ups like Blue Origin and Rocket Lab provide 
further capability to the US launch stable. Indeed, the commercial launch 
sector seems to be entering a period of United States dominance. 
 
In the intelligence area, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are aggressively pursuing 
benefits from the commercial sector, including from start-ups with small 
satellites. Growing capabilities and the availability of persistent 
observation of points of interest have changed the previously skeptical 
attitude of US intelligence providers regarding the commercial sector. As 
NRO director Betty Sapp said recently about the US government’s former 
development of its own buses and systems, “Those days are long gone.”45 
Today, with purchases from companies like Planet, DigitalGlobe, and 
others, the real problem facing the US intelligence community is how to 
handle the vastly increased flow of data. The NRO, according to Sapp, is 
using this commercial bonanza to plan for a future involving “integrated 
architectures that meet user needs with far more affordability, resiliency, 
and tolerance for failure.”46 
 
Another area where the United States has begun to show leadership is in 
the area of military space alliances. The underlying concept of military 
space cooperation begun during the Obama years has continued thus far 
under the Trump administration, providing benefits in terms of reduced 
cost, increased deterrence, and expanded resiliency, despite the recent 
emergence of new counterspace threats. Again, the prospects for space 
cooperation are greater for countries with existing military alliances, such 
as the United States. For the first time, the concept of a military space 
“network” is realistic. The Wideband Global SATCOM system now funded 
by the United States and eight of its close allies, who receive bandwidth in 
return for their financial contributions to this constellation of 
communications satellites, demonstrates this concept. 
 
In the area of space situational awareness agreements, US Strategic 
Command has now established 83 international data-sharing agreements 
to expand its network of satellite and debris information to improve space 
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safety and the effectiveness of US operations.47 Also, the Air Force 
announced the opening of the Combined Space Operations Center in the 
summer of 2018 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, completing a 
multiyear process of consultations and exercises that eventually led to the 
center.48 The initial foreign military partners will include Australia, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom. The point of this effort is to allow more 
rapid sharing of information among countries and the actual conduct of 
joint missions involving the commercial sector and the intelligence 
community. A supporting process—the Multinational Space Collaboration 
(MSC) initiative—is working with additional countries toward future 
cooperation in space situational awareness and operations, including 
Germany and France, with future participation expected from Italy, Japan, 
New Zealand, South Korea, and Spain.49 Another example of emerging 
military space cooperation is the Enhanced Polar System re- 
capitalization, in which US military communications payloads are being 
hosted on Norwegian polar-orbiting satellites, saving the United States 
some $900 million.50 US military space war games now also regularly 
include US allies. Notably, such military space partnerships have not yet 
emerged in either Russian or Chinese space policies or architectures. 
Neither country has significant military allies that are space-capable, and 
the two sides, despite other forms of military cooperation, have thus far 
exhibited inadequate trust for real cooperation in military space. 
 
The one area of space power where the United States’ commitment and 
plans remain somewhat vague is in civil space. Although President 
Trump’s one-page Space Policy Directive of December 2017 outlined a 
general goal of returning to the moon and moving on to Mars, it did not 
offer details on how to organize or fund such missions.51 The 
administration’s second directive on space in March 2018 provided more 
in- formation on commercial and military space but almost nothing about 
NASA.52 The currently flat NASA budget does not seem to offer enough 
flexibility to support major manned missions—absent new funding— and 
more recent discussion of trying to free up funds by privatizing the ISS do 
not seem realistic. The absence of a NASA administrator or a White House 
science advisor for over a year set back the organization’s planning 
process. It remains to be seen if the Trump administration will be able to 
make up for lost time in getting NASA back on track as a global civil space 
leader, as the commercial sector cannot be expected to carry out US 
scientific missions. 
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Russian Trends 
 
Russia’s course under Putin regarding space organizations and innovation 
has followed political dictates rather than global economic best practices. 
The Putin administration has steadily reversed the significant integration 
of the Russian space sector into the international market- place, with 
mixed (and sometimes negative) results. In sharp contrast to US and other 
Western trends—where small start-ups are driving a continuous process of 
innovation—the Russian situation has moved to- ward extreme 
centralization. Since forming the State Space Corporation Roscosmos, 
President Putin fired director Igor Komarov, who had come out of the 
commercial sector, and instead appointed his former deputy prime 
minister Rogozin to take over the agency in May 2018, suggesting the 
primacy of political loyalty over business experience. 
 
The problems Roscosmos faces today have much to do with the dis- 
connect between its nationalist agenda and its growing isolation from the 
rest of the space community. Ironically, the very success of the Russian 
space industry in integrating into global supply chains in the 1990s has 
now made it dependent on foreign components for construction of 
satellites. A recent study indicated that up to 75 percent of electronic parts 
on certain current-generation satellites come from the United States.53 
With the advent of Western sanctions after Russia’s 2014 seizure of 
Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, Russia has been forced to 
substitute substandard and often ill-fitting Russian or other foreign 
components from countries that do not adhere to UN sanctions. Russia 
may develop renewed capabilities, but it will take time and steady 
budgetary support for such efforts to succeed. 
 
A second problem facing Roscosmos relates to changes in the inter- 
national marketplace. In the 1990s, Russia was able to enter into the 
commercial marketplace successfully due to a combination of factors 
including low costs, avid buyers (from the West and China), and the 
existence of large stockpiles of “legacy” Soviet space products, especially 
launchers. However, as that legacy of rockets and other technology has 
gradually dwindled and Russian manufacturers have been spoiled by two 
decades of high Western prices for space products, the New Space 
revolution in the United States has created serious new challenges. Put 
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simply, prices are dropping, especially in the launch sector, and a variety 
of new products are now available from commercial start-ups that 
Roscosmos cannot produce or cannot offer with comparable quality and 
price. Russia had only one commercial launch in 2017; the rest were paid 
for by the state. Similarly, there is not a market for Russian 
communications satellites. As one recent Russian article observed 
regarding the quality of satellites produced under Roscosmos, “a 
significant portion of its satellites lack commercial potential” compared to 
their foreign, especially US, counterparts.54 The main niche Roscosmos 
fills today is human spaceflight—it is the only provider for astronaut 
transportation to and from the ISS. However, when NASA’s commercial 
crew program begins service (now planned for 2019), Russia will lose 
much of that business and the associated income. 
 
Russia’s uncertain and highly oil-dependent state budget is another 
problem facing the now re-centralized space industry. The long-term 
Russian space budget for the 2016 to 2025 period, originally planned for 
$70 billion, has now been reduced drastically to $20 billion.55 Looking 
ahead, Russia’s decision to put the bulk of its space investments into the 
military sector over the past few years has created a serious decline of 
planned state investments in civil and commercial space. One of the main 
enterprises within Roscosmos, the Khrunichev State Research and 
Production Space Center—builder of the workhorse Proton booster and 
new Angara rocket—has had to resort to selling some of its property and 
buildings to recoup costs not covered by existing funds from Roscosmos.56 
The problem stems, in part, from a drop in state orders from seven rockets 
to only three.57 This overall situation poses a serious threat to the long- 
term competitiveness of the Russian space industry. State orders are 
falling, and Russia does not have marketable products for the increasingly 
competitive and innovation-driven commercial market. 
 
Regarding innovation, Russia has become one of the least friendly 
countries for start-ups since the business-friendly Medvedev finished his 
one-term presidency in 2012. According to a recent report by experts at 
the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Assessments and Forecasts, the 
business and legal environments for space start-ups in Russia today are 
highly unfavorable.58 One Russian analyst describes a series of structural 
problems that have reduced its ability to organize itself for modern space 
operations (compared to during the Cold War), such that its share of the 
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international space market has now declined to between 1 and 3 percent.59 
Despite its declining budget, or perhaps because of it, Roscosmos itself has 
worked actively to block the emergence of commercial start-ups, 
supported by Russian regulators who have made it extremely difficult for 
entrepreneurs to obtain licenses to operate private space companies. As 
the Center for Strategic Assessments and Forecasts notes, even the list of 
requirements for establishing a space start-up is “classified,” adding that 
“to access it you need the permission of the FSB (Federal Security 
Service).”60 Despite these obstacles, several Russian start-ups do exist, 
some from Medvedev’s Skolkovo initiative. In the launch sector, for 
example, a small number of fledgling rocket builders have been able to 
find sponsors among Russia’s oligarchs and state-favored businesses. 
Nevertheless, the hurdles facing Russian space start-ups are formidable, 
making the kind of commercial space “innovation hubs” present in the 
United States unlikely to be developed or duplicated any time soon. 
 
Chinese Trends 
 
China has risen the fastest and farthest among major spacefaring countries 
over the past two decades and seems likely to continue on this trajectory. 
However, despite recent Chinese efforts to stimulate technology 
incubators with government-provided seed money, the bulk of Chinese 
space activities continue to be state-run and militarily controlled. As one 
Russian space analyst observed recently, “The Chinese model is really the 
Soviet model.”61 The point here is that state direction and state funding 
have gotten China to where it is today in space, an impressive 
accomplishment. However, defense analyst Richard Bitzinger notes that 
“critical weaknesses remain” within China’s military industry and that it 
has played the role of a “fast-follower” rather than that of an innovator.62 
The question is, can this path continue? 
 
Tai Ming Cheung from the University of California–San Diego has studied 
China’s military-industrial complex for more than two decades. He has 
documented China’s keen ability to acquire and reverse-engineer foreign 
technologies in the service of state programs, especially in the defense 
sector. However, he raises doubts about whether China can take the next 
step into innovation. Given the structure of Chinese industry, he observes, 
“Having the state define and pick winners and losers is not how long-term 
sustainable innovation happens.”63 He notes the increasing pressure on 
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Chinese companies to comply with government directions and controls, 
thus slowing innovation. 
 
China’s typical processes over the past few decades of developing new 
military technologies, as described by Cheung, “range from spending 
heavily on importing large amounts of [foreign] technology and engaging 
in collaboration to the use of more nefarious means, such as industrial and 
cyber espionage.”64 The question going forward is whether China can 
develop its own pathways to sustainable innovation rather than copying 
existing technologies. In a startling realization after the Chinese company 
Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment faced sanctions from the 
United States in the spring of 2018, Chinese leaders had to admit that the 
country still has a 90 percent dependence on foreign (mainly US) 
components for its semiconductor products.65 Regarding space launch, a 
recent article in the state-run newspaper Global Times lamented SpaceX’s 
accomplishments, “we are almost 10 years be- hind; more importantly, 
what our country has to desperately catch up with is actually a private US 
enterprise.”66 
 
Reforms, however, are being attempted. The problem, as Cheung notes, is 
that “the People’s Liberation Army and defense industrial regulatory 
authorities are seeking to replace this outdated top-down administrative 
management model with a more competitive and indirect regulatory 
regime, but there are strong vested interests that do not want to see any 
major changes.”67 Nevertheless, in 2014 China instituted new laws 
lowering financial thresholds and bureaucratic red tape in the 
establishment of private businesses. China hoped to stimulate the 
employment of new college graduates, spur the slowing economy, and 
accelerate technological innovation. It followed with more specific actions 
in 2015 aimed at fostering space start-ups.68 Overall, these actions 
succeeded in boosting the number of technology start-up companies in 
China, many facilitated by the establishment of government-funded start-
up “incubators” located around major universities, such as Beijing’s 
Tsinghua. Thus far, some 60 fledgling space companies have been 
registered, but the results have been somewhat disappointing.69 OneSpace 
Technologies conducted China’s first private launch in May 2018, but it is 
a solid-fuel rocket that only reached an altitude of 25 miles and lacked 
orbital velocity, thus putting it behind German rockets of the 1940s, which 
used more sophisticated and scalable liquid-fuel technology. Shanghai-
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based SpaceOK plans to build a constellation of 40 satellites aimed at sup- 
porting the government’s “One Belt, One Road” investment initiative 
across Asia.70 LandSpace hopes to begin solid-fuel rocket tests in 2018 
using former military rockets, while ExPace will use former military air 
defense missiles to attempt to enter the launch market.71 These dynamics, 
thus far, suggest that conditions mirroring those in the US market- place 
are still lacking in China and may require more political reforms to 
stimulate truly bottom-up innovation. 
 
Despite the existence of obstacles to innovation, China will continue to 
advance rapidly in space capability. Through its state institutions and its 
military, China is moving to fulfill ambitious plans to establish a presence 
on the moon, launch a large space station, develop space-based so- lar 
power, and harness the ability to mine asteroids.72 It will also seek to 
improve upon its already significant counterspace capabilities. However, if 
China’s economy wavers, that raises questions related to the pace and the 
sustainability of these efforts and leads to doubts about this state-led path 
in space. Thus far, there are few signs that game-changing commercial 
technologies will be developed in China. Moreover, if US commercial 
companies and allies can render attacks on US national space assets more 
of an inconvenience than an existential threat, China’s heavy investments 
into military space may simply be wasted. Former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Loverro noted in 2016 that US recon- naissance 
satellite cooperation involved “nearly 200 satellites and likely 20 ground 
infrastructures” and that the number of networked satellites would rise to 
“over 600” by 2020.73 As he concluded, “Using this lever to increase 
assurance of US imaging capacity presents an extremely com- plex 
problem to our adversaries, with little increase in our own costs.”74 
 
Conclusion 
 
The future of space power may not look like the past if current trends in 
the commercial space sector continue. As US Space Command’s Gen 
Howell Estes predicted in 1997 as he looked ahead in terms of space 
power, “It is not the future of military space that is critical to the United 
States—it is the continued commercial development of space that will 
provide continued strength for our great country in the decades ahead.”75 
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Similarly, trying to determine the likely relationship between the US 
military and commercial space sector back in 2002, Lt Col Peter Hays 
commented, “It is currently unclear that military means are the best way 
to protect commercial satellites or that the military will be called upon to 
build a more robust space infrastructure based on perceived threats to 
commercial systems.”76 Since Hays wrote that passage, the Cold War 
assumption that US military assets would be needed to “protect” 
commercial assets in space has been challenged even more, to the extent 
that it is now more common to discuss the concept of using commercial 
infrastructure or allied assets to provide resilience to what are seen as 
more vulnerable US military assets. If this trend continues, it may well be 
that commercial capabilities and allies will prove to be essential to 
sustainable space power by providing the mission assurance needed in 
various areas of space activity necessary for effective deterrence. 
 
Just because the United States has a vibrant, emerging commercial space 
start-up sector and strong friends and allies, however, does not mean it 
can assume future US power relative to its adversaries. As Gen Jay 
Raymond stated recently, “Space superiority is not a birthright; it must be 
earned.”7778 Indeed, a lack of investment in either dimension of national 
space capability (civil or military) or ineffective policies to engage (and 
draw upon) the commercial sector and allies could cause over- all US 
space power to fail to reach its potential. However, unlike some of the 
gloomy assessments of relative power trends frequently heard today 
within the US space community, there are also considerable grounds for 
believing that the United States has comparative advantages over Russia 
and even China thanks to emerging innovation in the commercial space 
start-up sector and the presence of increasingly space-capable allies. The 
problem facing both Russia and China in the twenty-first century is that 
their model for space development posits a dominant role for their 
governments, thanks in part to their leaderships’ insistence on absolute 
political control over the process and results of innovation. Reforming 
their state-centric model to favor start-ups and bottom-up innovation or 
sharing of assets with foreign governments would require loosening 
political controls. Such actions are feared by current Russian and Chinese 
leaders, making them unlikely to occur. State control over investment can 
successfully develop national space activities in periods of strong 
budgetary support and under conditions where technological innovation 
need only occur slowly. It is a less effective organizing principle in a fast-
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growing, globalized, information-based economy where market- based 
solutions can respond more quickly than state-led initiatives and where 
private capital is more readily available than government sources. Under 
these conditions, state-led strategies are more likely to fail. 
 
These points, however, should not make US policymakers overly 
confident. Continued slowness in US military acquisition and in 
establishing more resilient constellations, challenges posed by excessive 
government secrecy and export controls, and recent underfunding of space 
science and civil space could all cause the United States to miss the 
benefits from these favorable trends. To ensure that the US advantage in 
New Space comes to fruition regarding future space power, the US 
government and the US military must develop and follow through on 
initiatives aimed at institutionalizing strong US public-private and al- lied 
links in space. Also, the US should focus on moving from Cold War 
“technocracy” to twenty-first-century “netocracy.” Some of these action 
items should include: 
 
• Continuing to create favorable rules for the US commercial space 
sector that emphasize responsible behavior but allow for 
entrepreneurship; 
• Fostering international discussions and interpretations of the Outer 
Space Treaty that support commercial outcomes with proper 
national licensing procedures; 
• Engaging in sensible export control policies, allowing sharing of 
technologies that are already widely available from other foreign 
suppliers but preventing the export of cutting-edge technologies 
and purchases of US commercial space companies by non-allies; 
• Shaping the space security environment by building more binding 
international norms and rules against the creation of orbital debris 
(to include kinetic weapons testing) and interference with satellites, 
while emphasizing the rights of companies to prosecute foreign 
violators through existing international liability law; 
• Developing public-private partnerships to support US civil space 
activity, and continuing to invest in a robust space science and 
exploration agenda to build US leadership; 
• Supporting military space resilience and sustainability, as well as 
enhancing the military’s ability to work with the commercial sector, 
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especially start-ups, through expanded use of rapid acquisitions 
under “other transactional authorities” allowed under US law; and 
• Promoting policies that institutionalize cooperation with US allies 
in space, including joint space training, exercises, and operations. 
 
Overall, the United States remains the world’s leading space power and 
has the tools—national, commercial, and allied—to retain its comparative 
advantage in space. The challenge will be how to create flexible yet 
effective mechanisms to build a new, “netocracy” framework for US space 
power. Given emerging threats, this effort should focus on creating a 
shared deterrent posture based on resilience, superior numbers, 
continuous innovation, and cooperative resolve to deny adversaries any 
belief that they will benefit from starting a future conflict in space. In this 
way, the United States should be able to develop a robust commercial 
infrastructure and sustainable defenses to continue US space power under 
changing twenty-first-century conditions. 
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